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Abstract The emphasis of government legislation on money laundering has been
based on the assumption that reporting institutions are able to spot deviant customer
behaviour and that implicitly such behaviour is criminal. This paper looks at the
drivers for reporting of suspicious or unusual activity, in particular, focusing on the
principle of reputation. It considers the evidence over bank disclosure within annual
published reports with respect to their money laundering compliance activity;
particularly examining whether there was any change in disclosure and hence
reputation management reporting by those banks fined by the regulator for lapses of
compliance. An attempt is also made to apply the principles of legitimacy theory to
evaluate the association between money laundering and reputation looking for
evidence of a ‘virtuous cycle of compliance’. However, the findings point to limited
public awareness of money laundering and to the adoption of a deficit rather than
enhancement model of reputation management.
Imagery, rhetoric and ill-guided activism
Governmental efforts to counter money laundering are justified by the argument that
they are required in order to preserve the reputation and integrity of the financial
system [17]. This belief is most consistently espoused by the IMF who notes that
money laundering can “harm the soundness of a country’s financial sector as well as
the stability of individual financial institutions” [31, p II-4]. The current approach to
legislating against money laundering is justified on the grounds that it helps to make
the UK less attractive to potential launderers “protecting the financial sector from
operational and reputational risks” [18, Ch. 9, p. 1]. Van Duyne [35, p. 1] draws
attention to the new enemies of the financial system as being those “who do not take
moneys[sic] out of the financial system; but bring these into it”; the focus being very
much on the potential damage inflicted by tainted money co-mingling with
legitimate funds. However, if, after more than a decade of anti-money laundering
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legislation the threat rhetoric pervades, then surely financial systems, as pointed out
by van Duyne et al. [34], should be on the point of collapse from the effect of so
much cross-contamination. The authors also argue convincingly that past bank losses
have resulted from operational risk rather than an exclusive influx of crime-money
and suggest that arguments over integrity and reputation should be seen as “mere
rhetoric”. They go on to suggest that integrity is important not from the point of
view of the source of the funds but because of the trust bestowed in the bank by its
customers that it will properly handle their funds irrespective of whether they are
criminal or of honest intent [15]. Reuter and Truman [28, p. 60] make the valid
observation that “Banks... are quasi-public utilities, and the public does not want
them to be directly involved in handling dirty money”, however, money laundering
will only become a public issue when customers lose money [3, 17].
These monies once in the banks, irrespective of provenance, do not lie as cash
deposits but form part of the liability base to be used in their normal asset creating
activity, contributing to the legitimate expansion of the economy. Geiger and
Wuensch [9] remind us that money cannot be classified on the basis of observation
as being either tainted or clean as by definition it is abstract, performing its time
honoured role of being a store of value and means of exchange. Ross and Hannan
[29] offer the suggestion that the activity of moving illegally acquired funds through
a bank will be by way of systems and procedures that are entirely legal. Thus the tag
of laundering becomes attached by association with something else that is perceived
to be illegal. It is, therefore, appropriate to establish that integrity of the financial
system is built on trust and it is this element that contributes to reputation, not the
fact that criminals might maintain bank accounts.
Banks have always had sufficient incentives to avoid finding their names linked
with undesirable elements such that there is already an intrinsic motive for ‘due
diligence’ [17], enforced by existing criminal legislation. This desire can be seen as
being a sufficient motive for keeping the financial institution clean without the
additional layer of anti-money laundering measures [3]. It would appear that in the
absence of evidence relating to the size of the laundering phenomenon, legislation
has been based on rhetoric rather than fact [16]. This has the consequence that it is
being driven by ill-guided activism responding to the need to be “seen to be doing
something” rather than by an objective understanding of its impact on predicate
crime.
Does the existence of tainted funds affect the ways banks operate? The answer to
this has to be an emphatic ‘no’. Indeed, for the most part they will be completely
oblivious to the existence of criminal funds irrespective of obligations to report
suspicious activity in their role as government created regulatory intermediary.
Indeed, Alexander [2] notes that the regulatory authorities have elected to use banks
to combat money laundering activity on the assumption that laundering activity will
be evidenced via some unusual or anomalous account transaction that the banks will
be able to detect through their ‘inside knowledge’ of all financial transactions. It is,
without doubt an immense task to pick out the illegal from the multitude of
legitimate financial transactions that pass through the system, this point being made
almost a decade ago by Hampton and Levi [13].
Evidence suggests that measures are perceived as too severe relative to the risk of
money laundering and that compliance is sanction avoiding rather than viewed as
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good business practice [36]. This is an important observation, suggesting that banks
are merely going through the procedures as evidence of compliance rather than in
the expectation of unearthing criminal activity.
Reputation and the “virtuous cycle of compliance”
Far from being an objective construct, reputation is, like beauty, in the eye of the
beholder and thus not easily defined (refer to [14, p336]. It is not the purpose of this
paper to address this deficiency in the literature but to explore the extent to which
banks perceive money laundering as a risk to reputation.
There is little doubt that for a bank, damage to reputation will result in tangible
losses being incurred. This is because reputational damage is often linked to, or is
the result of, a perceived impairment in the bank’s financial soundness. The
immediate manifestation of this is likely to be through the actions of depositors as
they move to withdraw their funds, as well as from bank counterparties who
withdraw lines of credit. Such actions ultimately translate into a withdrawal of
shareholder support and subsequent negative impact on the share price. As suggested
by Harvey [14], “It may be assumed that in order to offset these costs, financial
institutions will be prepared to spend effort and resources (the tangible operational
costs) to prevent, control and insulate the institution from such tangible losses”.
Cost associated with compliance with anti-money laundering legislation is
justified by the belief that non-compliance will damage reputation with a consequent
loss of business, even if the involvement of the institution is unintentional. Indeed,
respondents to interviews reported by the principal author [17] and included in
Table 1 below, noted that reputation was linked to compliance, or more significantly
that there was a perceived risk of reputation damage that would arise from non-
compliance.
The relevant question to pose, however, is exactly where the association with
money laundering fits on the risk scale in the overall risk assessment exercises
routinely carried out by banks as part of their operational risk management control
processes. Within most financial institutions the usual approach is to model risk by
reference to a quantifiable loss associated with probability of risk occurring, such as
with value at risk (VaR) models. In so doing the bank effectively asks itself two
questions: firstly, how likely is it that the bank might unwittingly facilitate the
actions of money launderers? Secondly, in the event that it does, how great would be
the negative impact on its reputation? Depending on the answer, and consistent with
Harvey [14] above, it would be expected that the normal profit-maximising firm
would spend on counter-money laundering compliance only up to the point that the
costs incurred are equal to the estimated value placed by the firm on its reputation.
Two observations flow from this hypothesis:
1. Firms must be able in some way to quantify the value of their reputation
2. Firms must see a positive link between such compliance and reputation.
In the event that banks view the potential negative impact of association with
money laundering to be significant, one might expect to find evidence, as suggested
by Harvey [17] of a ‘virtuous cycle of compliance’. This implies that banks can see
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benefit to their reputation in being viewed as more compliant than their competitors.
If this was the case then it would be expected that as part of their stakeholder
management, information about their anti-money laundering controls and procedures
would be made public as an enhancement to reputation. Strangely, however, firms
are reluctant to divulge the amount being spent on compliance. Harvey [14]
surmised that this might arise from firms viewing compliance as an external cost and
as such outside the immediate control of management. This could be a result of a
general reluctance for financial institutions to disclose or share information regarding
amounts spent on compliance as such expenditure is viewed as a cost overhead
rather than providing benefit via enhancement to reputation [20].
This line of reasoning was also applied by Geiger and Wuensch [9] who indicated
that banks apply anti-money laundering rules in order to foster their own ‘reputation’
giving due consideration to minimising risk. However the authors note that the precise
definition of reputation risk and hence its subsequent measurement is problematic
simply because it would appear impossible to distinguish and hence separate
reputation risk linked to money laundering from risks arising from other aspects of
the bank’s operations. As already noted, most risk management models operate on the
basis that the institution is able to quantify the extent of loss that would arise in the
event that that the risk occurs. However, this is not possible to do for money
laundering. They draw attention to some interesting findings, noting that banks
Table 1 Views on reputation
Respondent Organisation Comment regarding reputation
Interviewee
1
Bank “Reputation risk is paramount, we do not want to be associated with
terrorist financing”
Expenditure on compliance “was being driven by reputation risk but
evidence is that fines do not damage reputation. Reputation
risk was only the fear of being fined”.
Interviewee
3
Self regulatory
body
“The risks arising from failure to comply are the financial hit of
regulatory damage and the smaller reputational damage together with
the threat of jail for their staff”
“Reputational risk damage so far has been contained as many
other institutions have the view ‘there but for the grace of God’”
Interviewee
4
Stock broker “The reputational benefits are huge. Paine Webber was fined £350.000
but lost business resulted in its closure …the reputational costs
provide sufficient incentive to comply”.
Interviewee
7
Bank “public sanction and reputation damage is enormous... it focus[es] the
minds of managers on the undesirability of FSA enforcement—
investigation is very time consuming—18 months and that is a huge
cost to business. If it goes wrong there is a six figure fine. Financial
institutions rely on having a good name; within [name of bank] this
would be viewed as extremely damaging and serious…this would have
a huge impact irrespective of whether we lost customers as a result”.
Interviewee
8
Law enforcement
agency
“Reputation risk is an issue. We have seen a tightening in [name of fined
bank] in respect of compliance”.
Respondent
A
Building society Benefits of compliance are: “Protection of reputation”.
Respondent
C
Stock broker Benefits of compliance are: “compliance with our regulators and secure
reputation”.
Harvey [14, 17]
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consider compliance with anti-money laundering legislation as essential and important,
however that implementation is costly. Of interest here, however is the observation (p.
91) that the impact of anti-money laundering rules on predicate offences is small. This
has resulted in the ludicrous situation highlighted by Harvey [14] of banks using the
number of SARs submitted to the regulators as an internal measure of performance.
Geiger and Wuensch [9] suggest that there may even be evidence of banks
transferring risk decision making to the regulators simply by filing SARs (p. 100).
Such an observation is consistent with Harvey [14, 17], Levi and Reuter [23], and Gill
and Taylor [10] all of whom have drawn attention to the tendency to report everything
that might appear merely unusual in order to achieve the regulatory equivalent of
‘covering their backs’. Issues relating to the gate keeping function of financial
institutions are also considered by Ross and Hannan [29, p.106] “.. the requirements
on agencies imposed by the risk-based approach involve a significant element of
uncertainty”. They make the point that the advantage for the regulators is that the risk-
based approach transfers responsibility for interpretation of the regulations to the
financial institutions. One gets the distinct feeling that rather than our virtuous cycle of
compliance we have instead a less than virtuous shifting of responsibility.
Reputation risk or fear of non-compliance?
From the forgoing, it might be deduced that the whole discussion of reputation and
compliance could be viewed from a deficit rather than enhancement perspective. In
other words, measures are put in place to avoid censure (deficit model of
compliance) rather than as an enhancement to reputation (enhancement model of
compliance). It is, therefore, interesting to further explore the concept of reputation
by returning to the content of a number of interviews conducted by the principal
author with a range of financial institutions and other relevant bodies. The method
employed and extracts from this research are reported in Harvey [14, 17]; however
reproduced here (Table 1 above) are all comments in which the word ‘reputation’
was mentioned. This information is drawn jointly from eight interviews and from 17
responses to a pilot questionnaire giving a total sample size of 25. From this, as
shown in the Table, only seven made comments about reputation. This would appear
to reinforce the view that compliance is seen to prevent any negative impact on,
rather than as a positive enhancement to, reputation. This is significant because it is
possible that this perception provides an explanation for the type of information that
banks will choose to disclose within their public documents. The implication is that
banks will do what is needed to retain their reputation at its existing level rather than
engaging with self-promotion with this compliance theme. If this is the case, it
should be expected that there will be little to find within annual reports and accounts
other than that required by statutory duty.
Theoretical arguments over bank disclosure
If indeed, there is a link that can be established between anti-money laundering
activity and a bank’s reputation, it might reasonably be underpinned by reference to
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academic theory. The focus of this work is to consider the evidence over bank
disclosure within annual published reports with respect to their money laundering
compliance activity; particularly examining whether there has been any change in
disclosure and hence reputation management by those banks fined by the regulator
for lapses of compliance. It is thus appropriate to consider both disclosure and
legitimacy theories.
Disclosure theory indicates that banks, as highly visible firms, should be more
likely to provide information on their activity in order to demonstrate a higher level
of corporate citizenship [6, 19, 32].
Legitimacy theory would indicate that as banks are bound by money laundering
legislation one should expect a high level of good quality disclosure on their anti-money
laundering activity. Bank decisions over disclosure are taken in order to establish their
legitimacy in the eyes of their stakeholders. Since legitimacy ‘resides in the public
opinion’ [5, p. 514] a firm must gain, maintain or repair [26, 33] its legitimacy by
satisfying its stakeholders. It follows, therefore, that any challenge to their legitimacy
would result in a bank increasing the level and quality of this disclosure.
Companies use their annual reports as a way of providing information and data
(both mandatory and voluntary) in a way that enables its stakeholders to interpret its
performance and integrity within the community. O’Donovan [25, cited in [26]]
noted the use of the annual report by management as a way of correcting
misconceptions the public may have formed about a company. It is also seen as
the ‘main disclosure vehicle’ [24, p. 196].
There is a tendency for legislative requirements and compliance to have a self-
reinforcing effect. For example, an increase in media attention focussed on banks fined
for insufficient compliance with money laundering regulations could lead to further
regulation, particularly where policy makers feel the need to be seen to ‘do something‘
which in turn could lead to a further increase in public awareness. This being the case
it might be expected to find a strong correlation between public awareness and content
of anti-money laundering statements within bank annual reports. Further a prior
expectation would be to find an increase in reporting undertaken by firms that were
fined for anti-money laundering breaches of compliance as part of ‘impression
management’, contributing to improvement of public perception.
In the event that banks view their anti-money laundering activity as a positive
enhancement to reputation it would be reasonable to expect greater disclosure of this
activity. More importantly any association in the minds of stakeholders between
money laundering and reputation would move banks to adopt an enhancement
approach to compliance as providing evidence of a ‘virtuous cycle of compliance’.
However, if banks only undertake the minimum required to avoid regulatory
sanction they are instead operating the deficit model.
Public awareness
Public awareness: there is no proper definition, neither for ‘public’ nor for
‘awareness’. For the purposes of this study it is assumed that a suitable proxy
measure of awareness is the media coverage, for the media reflect as well as create
public awareness. Therefore, changes in media attention, for our purpose concerning
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money laundering, is taken as changes in public awareness. In terms of disclosure, it
is expected that an increase in media coverage raises public attention to the issue.
Consequently, as a mean of response to the public, banks will signal to stakeholders
through annual reports and accounts and by press releases to the media its ‘good
conduct’ by drawing attention to or disclosing the amounts of money spent on
compliance as an indicator of the ‘cleanliness’ of their bank. As a further signal of
good practice these banks will wish to disclose increased amounts of information to
the media about their compliance with anti-money laundering legislation. Ashford
and Gibbs [4] found that proactive actions can ‘extend’ legitimacy ‘as management
attempts to win the confidence and support of wary potential constituents’ (p. 180).
Of course all of this needs to be set against the evidence of a ‘communications gap’
[36, p. 50] over public concern with money laundering, such that public awareness
remains low.
It is acknowledged that public perception is reflected in a wide range of media,
however, for this study the focus is on written newspaper articles, it being reasonable
to assume that newspapers will report on matters of public interest and attention. The
test material was collected by conducting two searches of the LexisNexis News and
Business Database using the search term “money laundering” in the article’s title
over each of the years for which data is available. This search produced the
information contained in Table 2 below.1 The first focused on the global data base
which provided an indication of the number of articles published that contain the
phrase ‘money laundering’ in the title, in all news and business publications across
the globe. A second search applying the same criteria was based solely on the UK
National Newspapers.
This Table, together with the associated Fig. 1 below, indicates a steady rise in the
numbers of articles written on money laundering on a global basis over the period
1980–1990 with a pronounced increase in the period 1999–2001, peaking in 2001.
There has been a decrease in reporting in recent years but with a second peak
occurring in 2005. It can be seen that the level of reporting is significantly lower in
the UK although there is a discernable increase in the same period with a matched
decrease in reporting in recent years (except for 2004 and 2005). This seems to
support the observation that money laundering may not be a significant issue as far
as the British ‘public’ is concerned. That said, if as would be expected under
legitimacy theory, banks are responsive to public awareness as an indicator, they
might have increased their disclosure on anti-money laundering within their report
and accounts, particularly around the period 2001 and again in 2005.
Content analysis
A rigorous method of qualitative analysis of the content of the annual report is
provided via the application of content analysis. Powell [27, p.50] describes content
1 Although the data base is available for every year during the 1980s, due to the very limited coverage of
money laundering during the decade, only selected years are provided here. There is no apparent
explanation for the disparity between the UK and the global data that occurs in 1984 nor for the drop in
coverage in the UK in 2004. Both of these were checked and appear to be accurate.
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analysis as providing ‘a systematic analysis of the occurrence of words, phrases and
concepts.’, whilst Krippendorff [21, p.21] notes its value as “a research technique
for making replicable and valid inferences from data according to their context.”
The most common methods of content analysis focus on volumetric studies that
include: word or sentence counting; page proportioning; frequency disclosure; and
instance counting. The justification for this approach is based on the argument that
‘the extent of disclosure can be taken as some indication of importance of an issue to
the reporting entity’ [21, p. 180]. The problem associated with all such quantitative
based methods is, however, that whilst they might be accurate and reproducible, they
give no indication as to the overall depth or quality of the narrative. Therefore, some
authors have used several methods of content analysis [7, 30] in analysing their data,
making use of various coding methods, checklists, instruments and decision rules
[11, 12], although it is recognised that within this approach there is an implicit
subjectivity in relation to the creation of content categories.
An earlier study by the second author, [22] conducted an initial content analysis
on the six largest UK banks: Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS); Barclays; Halifax Bank
of Scotland (HBOS); Lloyds TSB; Standard Chartered and Northern Rock for the
period 2000–2005. This work employed a simple quantitative approach by word
counting and sentence counting in relation to a content category of ‘money
laundering’. His findings, reproduced in Table 3 below, indicate that very little, and
indeed frequently nothing, is said on the matter of money laundering.
Table 2 Number of money laundering articles published in news and business publications by year for
the period 1980–2007
Year Number of hits “Money Laundering”
from all newspapers around the world
Number of hits “Money Laundering”
from UK national newspapers
1980 0 0
1981 1 0
1984 24 28
1985 82 2
1987 68 1
1990 278 22
1991 224 6
1992 168 5
1993 237 5
1994 410 21
1995 423 11
1996 511 11
1997 596 22
1998 973 30
1999 1761 77
2000 1672 60
2001 2727 112
2002 2553 58
2003 2410 64
2004 2118 7
2005 2763 60
2006 2597 36
2007 (to November 16th) 2236 39
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It is interesting to consider evidence of any relationship between public
perception, as proxied by reporting within the UK National press, and the average
number of words used by each bank in relation to its disclosure about money
laundering within the annual report, as indicated in Table 3. This is presented in
Fig. 2 below. Superficially, the results do appear to lend some support to the theories
of disclosure. However, whilst the peaks in media and hence ‘public awareness’
occurred in 2001 and 2005, the significantly smaller peak in reporting of money
laundering by banks appeared to be lagged in 2002 whilst being more coincident in
2005. This represents a very small if not absent correlation between ‘public
awareness’ and disclosure by banks. What we seem to have found is limited
awareness of money laundering and minimal reporting by banks.
Evidence on bank disclosure—what is said about anti-money laundering
activity
Extending upon the work of Lau [22] and including an additional bank; the findings
presented here are based on an analysis of the annual report and accounts for the
period 2001–2005, for seven UK banks that were selected on the basis of market
capitalisation. They included: Barclays; Halifax Bank of Scotland (HBOS); Hong
Kong Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC); Lloyds TSB; Northern Rock;
Standard Chartered; and Royal Bank of Scotland (RBOS).
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Fig. 1 Number of money laundering articles published in news and business publications by year for the
period 1980–2007. Data is shown as an index with the year 2000 = 100
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It could be argued that those banks that are better at risk management will want to
signal their superior risk management abilities to the market place via disclosures in
the annual report. This will take the form of written statements about their money
laundering compliance activity. For those banks that are committed to ‘good
practice’ in their procedures [8] disclosing such information to the public could
signal their efforts in combating money laundering. Ahmed and Courtis [1] showed
that banks with higher levels of risk have a greater incentive to demonstrate that they
are actively examining and managing those risks and to ensure they are not penalised
by regulators.
For the purposes of this paper the content recording unit was taken as any
voluntary disclosure made by the bank within the broad area of money laundering.
Such thematic coding allows for the allocation of content units to categories without
the restriction of punctuation. For example more than one sentence on anti-money
Table 3 Total “money laundering” disclosure by the six banks
Year Total number
of words
Average number
of words per bank
Total number
of sentences
Average number
of sentences per bank
2000 0 0 0 0
2001 9 1,5 1 0
2002 374 62 16 3
2003 136 23 6 1
2004 239 40 8 1
2005 469 78 20 3
Lau [22]
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Fig. 2 Relationship between media awareness and disclosure. Source Tables 2 and 3
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laundering can be coded together as one theme or it is possible to split one sentence
on the basis that it addresses different themes. Following on from this, it was
possible to identify a number of themes that enabled consistent categorisation of
content across all of the different banks. As explained in Appendix 1, which sets out
the process employed, these themes addressed (1) general anti-money laundering, (2)
training, (3) account related activity, (4) compliance or regulatory activity and (5)
any identification of reputation. A final category (6) addressed the related but
broader issue of financial crime. All disclosure could be fitted into these categories.
As might be expected, Table 4 demonstrates that banks tend to concentrate their
disclosure in two main areas: Firstly by reference to the regulatory framework with
which they are required to comply and secondly by reference to the measures in
place to counter money laundering. Of significance for the purpose of this study, is
the fact that very little is mentioned specifically with respect to reputation. Indeed,
reporting is this area is primarily undertaken only by HSBC, with an additional
reference to reputation risk from money laundering being made by Lloyds TSB in
2005. Otherwise all banks in the sample were silent in this respect. As explained in
“Appendix 1”, a method of scoring was devised that would attempt to add
qualitative depth to the disclosures in the field. To achieve this a very simple scoring
chart was applied to each of the main identified areas of disclosure which allocated a
point for each identified issue with a further point if this was supported via any
additional explanatory disclosure. Zero indicates that there was no mention in
relation to the category.
Ranking of the banks was simply the result of the summative score for each
institution, with the total maximum points allocated to each area of disclosure of
three points across each of the six themes, providing a possible maximum of 18.
Table 5 indicates that for most of the banks there is little provided in terms of
qualitative depth, apart from the 2002 report for Royal Bank of Scotland and the
more recent reports for Standard Chartered Bank. If banks see no need to disclose
more than the minimum information to stakeholders, it is suggested that reporting in
this area is driven by statutory requirement and is not used to enhance reputation;
indicating support for the deficit rather than enhancement model.
To reinforce this point, it is interesting to consider this in the context of those
banks included within the sample that have been the subject of fines for failure to
apply anti-money laundering regulations. The Bank of Scotland (now Halifax Bank
of Scotland) received a fine of £ 1.25 million in January 2004 and the Royal Bank of
Scotland a fine of £ 0.75 million in December 2002. However, the responses of these
two banks do not appear to be consistent with the theory. The most likely
explanation for this, in line with the interviewee comment above, is that the
reputation of the bank might simply have been unaffected by the fine being imposed,
i.e. there was no identified damage associated with the fine that required ‘perception
management’2. It is of course possible that the medium chosen for more detailed
analysis might be the Bank’s Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) reports.
2 Or, alternatively, that ‘perception management’ consisted of not attracting attention.
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Clearly a limitation of this paper is that it has not been possible to include these
reports within the study. However, previous work by the second author [22] did look
at disclosures within the CSR reports3 including those for both of these banks.
Unfortunately, his findings did not point to any consistency of response by the fined
banks. As already noted, despite being fined in January 2004, Halifax Bank of
Scotland failed to disclose any information in the broad area of money laundering
within any of their annual reports. They appear to have made some (albeit still
limited) attempt to cover money laundering disclosure within their CRS reports with
disclosure rising from zero in 2003 to two sentences (58 words) in 2004, and to eight
sentences totaling 211 words in 2005. This apparent indifference appears to support
the observation that the fine did not impact on public perception and hence on the
reputation of the bank. From this it would appear that if a bank is subject to a fine
and if no-one pays attention it is not in the interest of the bank to draw attention to its
imposition. Indicating perhaps that we have ‘perception management’ by ‘awareness
avoidance’.
Disclosure by the Royal Bank of Scotland (fined in December 2002) has already
been noted within their Annual Reports with detailed disclosure occurring only in
2002. CSR reports for the bank were available for the period 2003 to 2005 and these
indicated extensive coverage in 2004. Disclosure regarding money laundering rose
from five sentences (124 words) in 2003, to 59 sentences (1,341 words) in 2004
before significantly decreasing to a total of only 16 sentences (367 words) in 2005.
Looking at the specific content of the 2004 CSR report the bank covers the main
themes identified above including discussion of: Account Monitoring; the Joint
Money Laundering Steering Group (JMLSG); Training; Know Your Customer
(KYC) and SARS; and reference to relevant legislation. Given that the increase in
disclosure occurred in 2004 rather than in 2003 as might have been expected, it is
highly likely that this change is purely coincidental and not as an attempt to manage
perception.4
Table 4 Money laundering disclosure by all of the banks
Category of disclosure and number of times identified Year Total
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Measures to counter money laundering 1 4 4 3 2 14
Training 0 2 1 2 1 6
KYC, account monitoring and SARS 0 2 0 2 1 5
Compliance and regulation 0 7 6 1 4 18
Reputation and risk 0 1 1 1 2 5
Financial crime 0 1 0 0 2 3
TOTAL 1 17 12 9 12 51
3 Using his approach of sentence and word counts.
4 The only way that this might have been verified would have been through interview with the fined
banks, unfortunately, on approach, whilst the Money Laundering Reporting Officer within one of the
banks was willing to explore the impact on the bank of having been the subject of a fine it was disclosed
that “one of the terms of the FSA Enforcement notice was that we would not discuss the matter with any
third party other than the FSA”. (e-mail exchange with author).
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Conclusion
The findings from this work find little support for the enhancement model and its
associated ‘virtuous cycle of compliance’. Instead it is apparent that very little is
disclosed by UK banks about their money laundering compliance activity. This
would appear to support the findings from the earlier interviews whereby
compliance is undertaken to prevent a negative impact on, rather than as an
enhancement to, reputation. This may be because such expenditure is seen as a cost
overhead [20] so that compliance is sanction avoiding rather than good business
practice [36]. It may also be that money laundering does not feature on the Richter
scale of ‘public awareness’ and as such there is no public perception that needs to be
managed.
Discussion
Despite more than two decades of anti-money laundering legislation, public
perception of money laundering remains low. Press coverage, although increasing,
is at such a low level that the fines metered out to banks shown to be failing in their
money laundering compliance did not have any apparent impact on customer
perception or on bank image. Indeed this is perhaps to be expected given that the
fines were for procedural omissions. This situation is only likely to change when
customers lose money as a result of a bank being associated with money laundering.
It is clear that banks have an inherent interest in preserving their reputation with
respect to their being able to safely and properly handle the funds entrusted to them
by all of their customers. Clearly if banks regarded the link between anti-money
laundering compliance and reputation building as significant for business, much
more disclosure would occur. However, evidence from the interviews indicated that
compliance was undertaken in order to avoid the impact of a fine, whilst the limited
disclosure within the annual reports focused primarily on the harmless discussion of
the regulatory framework. It would appear, therefore, that banks are adhering to a
deficit rather than enhancement model with activity undertaken merely to prevent
any possible negative impact rather that as a positive contributor to reputation.
In the light of this, there is no foundation for the application of the ‘threat
rhetoric’ in which anti-money laundering legislation is required for, and driven by
Table 5 Quality of disclosure by individual banks
Bank Year
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Barclays Bank 1 5 5 0 5
Halifax Bank of Scotland (HBOS) 0 0 0 0 0
Hong Kong Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC) 0 1 1 1 1
Lloyds TSB Bank 1 0 0 3 1
Northern Rock Bank 0 0 2 3 0
Standard Chartered Bank 0 2 2 14 11
Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) 0 16 5 0 4
Crime-money, reputation and reporting 69
the need to preserve the reputation of the financial sector. From the foregoing, there
is little to suggest that compliance is linked to reputation. Instead, legislation must be
based on a clear demonstration of its impact on underlying crime not on ill-guided
activism. If the regulatory bodies really do wish to operate a risk-based model of
compliance then let us have a free and open debate to establish the proper magnitude
of such risk. Until this occurs, banks will merely do what is required by statute and
far from the desirable ‘virtuous cycle of compliance’ there will continue to be a less
than virtuous shifting of responsibility between the regulator and the regulated, with
the latter merely doing sufficient to proverbially ‘cover their backs’.
Appendix: approach to classification
Annual reports were obtained for each of the years 2001–2005 for the seven banks
selected for the study. The banks included in the analysis were: Barclays; Halifax
Bank of Scotland (HBOS); Hong Kong Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC);
Lloyds TSB; Northern Rock; Standard Chartered; Royal Bank of Scotland (RBOS).
Compilation of the Scoring Chart for the analysis follows an iterative process. For
each of the reports all sections where identified that directly disclosed information in
relation to money laundering or indirectly linked with the issue or money laundering
(such as combating financial crime). For each bank it was possible to sort disclosure
into a number of main categories as identified by that bank. From this it was possible
to identify a number of broad money laundering themes into which each of the
identified sections could be classified. As discussed below, these themes addressed
general anti-money laundering, training, account related activity, compliance or
regulatory activity and any identification of reputation. A final category addressed
the related but broader issues of financial crime. As a test for robustness of the
system of coding, the initial analysis was conducted by one of the authors and then
independently repeated by the other author. Having agreed the classification, all
disclosed information was analysed with respect to depth and quality of disclosure.
To achieve this a very simple scoring chart was applied to each of the main identified
areas of disclosure as follows:
1. Each issue of money laundering disclosed—one point
2. Explanation of such issue of disclosure—one point
3. Explanation of usage of such issue—one point
4. No disclosure—zero points
Ranking of the banks was simply the result of the summative score for each
institution, with the total maximum points allocated to each area of disclosure of
three points across each of the six themes, providing a possible maximum of 18. The
broad categories used for the analysis were:
Measures to counter money laundering included: mention of anti-money
laundering; money laundering prevention and combating money laundering.
Training included all references to training within the field.
Know your Customer (KYC), account monitoring and SARs included all
discussion of KYC and other account monitoring for the purposes of money
laundering including reference to suspicious activity reports (SARs)
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Compliance and Regulatory activity included all mention of compliance or
regulations and money laundering legislation together with any reference to the
Money laundering reporting officer (MLRO) and to the joint money laundering
steering group (JMLSG)
Reputation and Risk refers to identification of reputation risk and money
laundering risk
Financial crime refers to risk of financial crime and measures aimed at
preventing financial crime.
On the basis of this approach it was possible to sort the information contained
within the various reports and assign a total score to each of the banks. An example
of how this was conducted is included here: Standard Chartered Bank’s annual
report for 2002 states that: “The Group continues to strengthen its money laundering
prevention policies, procedures and training”. Under our approach to the coding this
receives a point for the mention of money laundering prevention and a point for the
mention of training. By comparison, Lloyds TSB report for 2005 states the
following: “Group Compliance also provides leadership on compliance with money
laundering and terrorist financing legislation and regulation across the Group. It
sets group policy and standards on the topic and undertakes high level oversight of
anti money laundering risks. A specialist team within Group Compliance provides a
centre of excellence on the relevant legislation and regulation as well as interfacing
with external public and private bodies in order to evolve the Group’s approach and
seek to ensure greater effectiveness and focus on key risk areas. Its remit also
includes compliance with financial sanctions”.
Using our coding the following would apply. The identified area of compliance is
discussed in some detail. It identifies the broad spectrum of money laundering
compliance and regulation, it states the approach of the bank (albeit briefly) on how
it will carry out compliance activity and adds further explanatory detail regarding the
identified specialist team. This is provided with a score of 3. In addition the mention
of one of the other classification areas of risk scores an additional point, providing a
total score of 4.
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